01660985

Component

This article explores the coalitional stability of a new cooperative control policy for freeways and parallel queuing facilities with multiple servers. Based on predicted future delays per queue or lane, a VOT-heterogenous population of agents can agree to switch lanes or queues and transfer payments to each other in order to minimize the total cost of the incoming platoon. The strategic interaction is captured by an n-level Stackelberg model with coalitions, while the cooperative structure is formulated as a partition function game (PFG). The stability concept explored is the strong-core for PFGs which the authors found appropriate given the nature of the problem. This concept ensures that the efficient allocation is individually rational and coalitionally stable. The authors analyze this control mechanism for two settings: a static vertical queue and a dynamic horizontal queue. For the former, the authors first characterize the properties of the underlying cooperative game. The simulation results suggest that the setting is always strong-core stable. For the latter, the authors propose a new relaxation program for the strong-core concept. The simulation results on a freeway bottleneck with constant outflow using Newell's car-following model show the imputations to be generally strong-core stable and the coalitional instabilities to remain small with regard to users' costs.

This paper was sponsored by TRB committee ADB30 Standing Committee on Transportation Network Modeling.

18-06538

English

6p

2018

Transportation Research Board 97th Annual Meeting

Digital/other

References

Bottlenecks; Freeway management systems; Queuing; Routing; Traffic control

Highways; Operations and Traffic Management

Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting 2018 Paper #18-06538

TRIS, TRB, ATRI

Jan 8 2018 11:41AM