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Title:
GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATIONS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN DYNAMIC TRAFFIC CONTROL AND DYNAMIC TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT
Accession Number:
00755129
Availability:
Transportation Research Board Business Office
500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001 United States
Abstract:
The dynamic traffic control problem and the dynamic traffic assignment problem are integrated as a noncooperative game between a traffic authority and highway users. The objective of the combined control-assignment problem is to find a mutually consistent dynamic system-optimal signal setting and dynamic user-optimal traffic flow. The combined control-assignment problem is first formulated as a one-level Cournot game: the traffic authority and the users choose their strategies simultaneously. The combined control-assignment problem is subsequently formulated as a bi-level Stackelberg game. The traffic authority is the leader; it determines the signal settings in anticipation of the users' reactions. The users are followers who choose their routes after the signal settings have been determined. Finally, the system-optimal control-assignment problem is formulated as a Monopoly game. The sole player - the traffic authority - determines both signal settings and traffic flows to achieve a dynamic system-optimal solution. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the equilibria of the games.
Supplemental Notes:
This paper appears in Transportation Research Record No. 1617, Land Use and Transportation Planning and Programming Applications.
Corporate Authors:
Transportation Research Board
500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001 United States
Features:
Figures
(5)
; References
(28)
; Tables
(1)
Subject Areas:
Highways; Operations and Traffic Management; Planning and Forecasting; I72: Traffic and Transport Planning
Created Date:
Oct 27 1998 12:00AM
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