00453091

Component

http://onlinepubs.trb.org...trr/1985/1012/1012-001.pdf

https://scholar.google.co...rman&publication_year=1985

When U.S. airlines, railroads, and motor carriers were deregulated, the incentives for organized labor in collective bargaining changed, causing more active participation in the containment of labor costs. Industrywide improvements in labor utilization and productivity resulted and much of the subsequent savings passed directly to the consumer. In the transit industry, regulatory reform has been largely overlooked as a mechanism to facilitate progress in collective bargaining. However, a unique sequence of events in Chicago--the growth of private transit--provides a clear demonstration of the potential of the private sector in an environment free from regulatory entry barriers. State and local regulatory bodies have not enforced applicable transit regulation and have permitted the private entrepreneurs to enter into direct competition with public transit operators. The implications of regulatory reform for organized labor in the transit industry are explored, focusing on the situation in Chicago. A case study example is provided of how the removal of regulatory entry barriers can alter the incentives of the public transit operator's labor force. The impact of the new low-cost services on the elasticity of demand and ridership levels of the city's public transit services is measured, and how these changes might affect the position of the labor force at the bargaining table is debated. The findings have important implications for assessing the potential benefits of regulatory reform in the urban transit industry.

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01419898

pp 1-7

1985

Transportation Research Record

0309039010

Print

Figures (4) ; References (13) ; Tables (3)

Administration; Collective bargaining; Competition; Demand; Deregulation; Elasticity (Mechanics); Incentives; Labor costs; Labor unions; Private enterprise; Public transit; Regulatory reform; Ridership

Chicago (Illinois)

Administration and Management; Economics; Highways; Public Transportation; Society; I10: Economics and Administration

TRIS, TRB

May 31 1986 12:00AM

• AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS COMPUTER PACKAGE FOR URBAN HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENTS
• BUS STATION SECURITY: CRIME AT INTERCITY BUS STATIONS (DISCUSSION AND CLOSURE)
• INTERCITY BUS DEREGULATION: THE IMPACT ON URBAN AND RURAL PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN THE PROVISION OF INTERCITY BUS FEEDER SERVICE (ABRIDGMENT)
• INTERCITY BUS PASSENGER PROFILE
• INTERCITY BUS SERVICE CHANGES FOLLOWING THE BUS REGULATORY REFORM ACT OF 1982
• PRICING OPTIONS FOR URBAN TRANSPORTATION MODES
• SUBSIDIES, POLITICAL CONTROL, AND COSTS OF U.K. URBAN BUS PROVISION
• THE CONTESTABILITY OF THE U.K. INTERURBAN BUS MARKET
• THE DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR AIRMAIL SERVICE BY THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
• THE IMPACT OF BUS DEREGULATION ON SMALL TOWNS