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Title:

Smart Grid Charging of Electric Vehicles: EV-Owner Response to Scheduling and Pricing under Myopic Loss Aversion in an Ultimatum Two-Player Game

Accession Number:

01559838

Record Type:

Component

Availability:

Transportation Research Board Business Office

500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001 United States

Abstract:

Upward expectations of future electric vehicle (EV) growth pose the question about the future load on the electricity grid. While the literature on demand side management of EV charging has focused on technical aspects and considered EV-owners as utility maximizers, this study looks at the neglected psychological dynamics of EV-owners facing charging decisions and interacting with the supplier. This study represents these dynamics by proposing a behavioral framework of utility maximization under myopic loss aversion within an ultimatum two-player game framework. The EV-owner and the electricity supplier are the two players, the EV-owner faces three decisions (i.e., whether to postpone the charging to off-peak periods, which discount to request to the supplier for off-peak charging, which discount to accept for supplier-controlled charging), and there are two contract durations where the EV-owner decides daily (short-term) or weekly (long-term). The experimental analysis included six treatment conditions from the combinations of the three decisions with the two contract durations, and results showed that: (i) EV-owners perform charging choices not as pure utility maximizers, but are affected by myopic loss aversion resulting from monetary considerations as well as the ultimatum game with the supplier; (ii) EV-owners are open towards centralized smart-grid strategies optimizing the load on the grid from a system optimum perspective; (iii) the frequency of charging decisions (daily versus weekly contract) favors on the one hand utility maximization behavior of EV-owners and induces on the other hand myopia with a favorable cost minimization for the supplier.

Supplemental Notes:

This paper was sponsored by TRB committee ADB10 Traveler Behavior and Values.

Monograph Accession #:

01550057

Report/Paper Numbers:

15-2952

Language:

English

Corporate Authors:

Transportation Research Board

500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001 United States

Authors:

Fetene, Gebeyehu Manie
Kaplan, Sigal
Sebald, Alexander Christopher
Prato, Carlo Giacomo

Pagination:

17p

Publication Date:

2015

Conference:

Transportation Research Board 94th Annual Meeting

Location: Washington DC, United States
Date: 2015-1-11 to 2015-1-15
Sponsors: Transportation Research Board

Media Type:

Digital/other

Features:

Figures; References; Tables

Candidate Terms:

Smart grid

Uncontrolled Terms:

Loss aversion

Subject Areas:

Economics; Highways; Planning and Forecasting; Safety and Human Factors; I72: Traffic and Transport Planning

Source Data:

Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting 2015 Paper #15-2952

Files:

TRIS, TRB, ATRI

Created Date:

Dec 30 2014 12:59PM